UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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S/1997/75
24 January 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 24 JANUARY 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF GEORGIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the letter dated 20 January 1997 from the Chairman of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia, Mr. Tamaz Nadareishvili, addressed to you.

May I ask your kind assistance in circulating the text of the present letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dr. Peter CHKHEIDZE
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

97-02125 (E) 240197

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Annex

Letter dated 20 January 1997 from the Chairman of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia addressed to the Secretary-General

Allow me at the outset to congratulate you sincerely on your appointment as Secretary-General of the United Nations.

We strongly believe that your profound experience and diplomatic skills will ensure the Organization's effective service to the world community and, among other important problems, will contribute to the comprehensive settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia.

The situation in Abkhazia demands a firm approach. Unfortunately, the gross violations and crimes perpetrated by the separatists still go unpunished, for there are strong forces, particularly in the Russian Federation, which support the separatists and encourage this dangerous trend.

The Abkhaz authorities have flagrantly violated and still continue to override the rights of the Georgian population in the region. Intimidation, banditry, executions, illicit traffic of arms and narcotics, abuse and desecration of historical and cultural monuments have long been the abiding characteristic of the policy pursued by the Abkhaz leadership.

Despite the present circumstances, the Abkhaz leadership continues to appeal shamelessly to the Government of the Russian Federation as well as to various international organizations for economic aid and for the lifting of certain restrictions that in no way constitute sanctions against Abkhazia, and are imposed by the Government of Georgia to prevent the influx of illegal cargoes, mercenaries, narcotics and arms.

At a time when the negotiating process is stalled and the hundreds of thousands of refugees still have no realistic perspective of returning to their homes, the international community should strictly condemn and discourage such unjustified demands.

We are very well aware that the economy of the region is practically devastated and needs serious assistance on the part of the international community. We would welcome such efforts only after Georgia's territorial integrity has been reinstated and the Abkhaz authorities have fulfilled their obligations with respect to the return of the refugees and displaced persons.

We express strong confidence that under your guidance the United Nations and its Security Council will achieve substantive progress in the peace process leading to the comprehensive settlement of the dispute.

(Signed) Tamaz NADAREISHVILI
Chairman of the Supreme Council
of Abkhazia

UNITED NATIONS **S**

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S/1997/76
27 January 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 20 JANUARY 1997 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT).

Brigadier-General Hasan Abaza (Jordan), who has been the Chief Military Observer of UNMOT since 12 October 1994, relinquished his post on 31 December 1996. Following consultations with the parties concerned, it is my intention to appoint Brigadier-General Boleslaw Izydorczyk (Poland) as the next Chief Military Observer of UNMOT.

I should be grateful if you would convey this information to the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

97-02263 (E) 270197

UNITED NATIONS

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Security Council

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S/1997/77
27 January 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 27 JANUARY 1997 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 20 January 1997 (S/1997/76) concerning your intention to appoint Brigadier-General Boleslaw Izydorczyk (Poland) to succeed Brigadier-General Hasan Abaza (Jordan) as the next Chief Military Observer of the United Nations Military Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Council. They agree with the intention contained in the letter.

(Signed) Hisashi OWADA
President of the Security Council

97-02269 (E) 270197

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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S/1997/78
27 January 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 27 JANUARY 1997 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter from the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Mr. Milan Milutinović, addressed to you.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vladislav JOVANOVIC
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

97-02275 (E) 300197

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Annex

Letter dated 25 January 1997 from the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have been informed of the contents of the letter addressed to you by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Kofi Annan, on 21 January 1997 (S/1997/62) concerning the further process of implementation of the Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (the region).

Although the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is not a signatory party to the Basic Agreement, it has made a significant contribution to the achievement of a peaceful solution and its successful implementation thus far. In this respect, we have had fruitful cooperation with the Transitional Administrator, Mr. Jacques Paul Klein, members of the Security Council Contact Group, Governments of the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) contributing countries and all other international factors. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is vitally interested in ensuring lasting peace and stability in this region on the basis of the consistent implementation of the Basic Agreement. Finally, our lasting commitment to normal, good-neighbourly relations with the Republic of Croatia, which have broader significance for the stability and future of this part of Europe, is well known.

In view of the above, we consider that it is of exceptional importance that each new step towards the realization of the goals of the Basic Agreement and the relevant Security Council resolutions be carefully and comprehensively assessed. In this context, it is of particular importance to take into account equally the arguments of the signatory parties to the Agreement, the universal principles on the protection of national minorities and the realities concerning the position of the Serbs in Croatia.

We consider that the letter dated 13 January 1997 from the Government of Croatia (S/1997/27) contains a number of useful initiatives and positive elements. At the same time, it is evident that the letter contains a number of ambiguities and fails to address certain issues, while some positions, in our view, depart from the text and the goals of the Basic Agreement. In this context, we consider that the requests of the Serbs presented in their letter addressed to the Security Council through the Transitional Administrator, Mr. Jacques Paul Klein, on 16 January 1997, are well founded and deserve to be carefully considered. Accordingly, we proceed from the fact that, the Security Council, by its resolution 1023 (1995), reinforced the Basic Agreement concluded between the representatives of the Government of Croatia and the Serbs from the region.

We consider that it is of crucial importance to maintain the integrity of the region, first of all because it corresponds to the integrity of the Serb population in that area, which is very significant for their feeling of security, and prospects for the preservation of the lasting multi-ethnic

composition and equality of all residents, irrespective of their ethnic origin or religion. The aim from the letter to divide the region administratively into two districts and to divide the districts into 27 municipalities would not only constitute an administrative fragmentation of the compactness of the Serbs as a national minority, but would lead to discrimination against them and increase their feeling of endangerment and insecurity. The administrative division, which by breaking up the territory wholly populated by Serbs and connecting its parts to the places and towns outside of the region with a predominantly Croatian population, would result in the Serbs becoming the minority in the greatest number of municipalities, with an insignificant number of exceptions, without adequate influence on the decision-making in local self-government. This would, despite the positions and promises concerning cultural autonomy, no doubt practically prevent the preservation of their national and cultural identity. This is also contrary to the positions of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on the prevention of administrative divisions aimed at changing ethnic composition to the detriment of national minorities (see the CSCE Helsinki Document 1992, chap. VI, para. 27).

We are deeply convinced that the preservation of the integrity of the region is an essential precondition for the realization of the rights of the Serbian community in the spirit of the Basic Agreement. Paragraph 12 of the Basic Agreement provides for the right of the Serbian community to appoint a Joint Council of Municipalities, which represents an important precondition for guaranteeing the Serbs adequate influence on the conditions and perspectives of their life and development. The question is - what kind of Council of Serbian Municipalities would it be and would it be able truly to influence the realization of the rights of the Serbian community - since the proposed administrative division would make it practically impossible to create the municipalities with predominantly Serbian population.

The respect for this integrity of the region as a single administrative unit is a request of the Serbs known to the Transitional Administration and to other international factors ever since the signing of the Basic Agreement and the first talks on administrative organization. This request is in accordance with international standards and it in no way brings into question any principle of the State organization of Croatia. Finally, the fact of the matter is that the Basic Agreement refers to the region as a whole. This stems from the goals to protect the equality of the Serbs as a national minority in a religiously and historically specific territory. It is not a coincidence that the Basic Agreement, from its title to its last provision, refers to the region as a whole, defining its specific problems, relations and goals.

We feel obliged to draw the attention of the Security Council to the fact that the realization of the administrative division of the region in a way that would change its demographic structure to the detriment of the Serbs, would generate insecurity and cause a massive exodus of the Serbs, as well as the "ethnic cleansing" of the region. We do not believe that this is in anyone's interest, least of all that of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which has for years shouldered the overwhelming burden of providing assistance and shelter to over 700,000 refugees. Therefore, we expect that this very important request of the Serbs will be accorded necessary attention, both in view of the realities

and the international norms, so that unforeseeable harmful consequences can be avoided.

As far as the elections are concerned, the Basic Agreement (para. 12) provides that they be held "not later than 30 days before the end of the transitional period". The mandate of UNTAES has been extended by the Security Council in its resolution 1079 (1996) until 15 July 1997, as well as a further United Nations presence, possibly a restructured UNTAES, "for the six-month period beginning from 16 July 1997".

The equality and security of all residents of the region represent foundations of the Basic Agreement. Paragraph 4 of the Agreement provides that "all persons who have left the region or who have come to the region with previous permanent residence in Croatia shall enjoy the same rights as all other residents of the region". Paragraph 7 of the Agreement provides that "all persons who have left the region or who have come to the region with previous permanent residence in Croatia have the right to live in the region". Consequently, the residents of the region should not be discriminated against with regard to any right, including the right to participate in the elections, regardless of when they settled or the length of their stay in the region. The only criterion provided for by the Basic Agreement is that the resident of the region had previous permanent residence in some part of Croatia. Therefore, we consider that there are no grounds for making a resident's right to vote conditional on whether he/she lived in the region before the very beginning of the UNTAES mandate, that is, 15 January 1996.

The motives and conditions under which the Serbs came to the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium from other parts of Croatia, primarily from Western Slavonia and Krajina, are also well known, as are the obstacles to their free return to their places of origin (see the Security Council presidential statement of 20 December 1996 (S/PRST/1996/48) and the reports of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Mrs. Elisabeth Rehn). Therefore, we expect the Security Council to intercede so that the aforementioned unfounded conditions contained in the letter of the Croatian Government will be deleted.

There is no doubt that the framework provision of the Basic Agreement (para. 12) and paragraph 7 (b) of Security Council resolution 1079 (1996), on the one hand, and the crucial assessment of whether real conditions for free and fair elections have been ensured in the period before the ballot, on the other, are important for the timing of the elections. The Basic Agreement, as well as the past decisions of the Security Council provide no grounds for the elections in the region to be connected with the elections in other parts of Croatia. The date of the latter elections should not prejudge the conditions and timing of the elections in the region, since it is obvious that the conditions in the region differ from those in other parts of Croatia. Finally, the elections in the region will, in any case, be organized by UNTAES, which is explicitly provided for in paragraph 12 of the Basic Agreement, and not by the Croatian Government.

In this respect, I wish to draw your attention to the fact that this position has been set forth in paragraph 11 (e) of Security Council resolution

1037 (1996) and elaborated in detail in the report of the Secretary-General of 12 December 1995 (S/1995/1028, para. 16 (g)), which is an integral part of the said resolution. By these decisions, the Security Council has clearly defined the obligations of UNTAES with respect to the organization of the elections, and in particular the definition of the borders of the municipalities, districts and regions. Therefore, there are no grounds in the decisions of the Security Council for UNTAES to delegate its rights and duties; and it is obliged to realize them directly. Such a conclusion is logical, not only in view of the above decisions of the Security Council, but in view of the fact that we have just embarked upon the second part of the transitional period. We believe that the Security Council had justified reasons for taking such a decision and that the developments in the meantime have not brought into question their validity.

The role of OSCE in the monitoring and preparation of the elections in the region is an important element of, and precondition for, the consistent implementation of the Basic Agreement. This proceeds not only from the provisions of the Basic Agreement (para. 12), but from the very nature of the problems of the region, which concern security, cooperation and the realization of human and civil rights. Therefore, we expect the Security Council to point to the need for the timely inclusion of OSCE in the monitoring of the conditions and all activities connected with free and fair elections in the region.

Allow me to emphasize also that the overall atmosphere among the population of the region is still precarious, owing to the aggressive media campaign of the Croatian electronic media and press and frequent telephone harassment of its residents, as well as occasional unauthorized intrusion of the notorious Croatian extremists in the settlements and homes of certain residents of the region. The slow and inconsistent approach towards the implementation of the Amnesty Law causes particular concern. Namely, there are a few hundred Serbs still in Croatian prisons. Most of them were originally imprisoned on charges "that they participated in armed rebellion", and as such should have been released under the new Amnesty Law. This expectation of the Serbs, as well as of the international factors (the positions of the Council of Europe) has not been fulfilled, because after the entry of the Law into force the original charges were modified to other criminal acts which are not subject to amnesty. This, in effect, circumvents the implementation of the Amnesty Law and increases insecurity and anxiety among the population of the region, which expected relief from the consistent implementation of amnesty.

In that respect, we would like to recall the assessments contained in the presidential statement of 20 December 1996 (S/PRST/1996/48) and in particular the paragraph, in which it is stated, inter alia, that "the Security Council is deeply concerned at reports that the new amnesty law is not being implemented in a fair and equitable manner. It underlines that equitable application of that law is vital for building confidence and promoting reconciliation in Croatia as well as for the peaceful reintegration of the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium."

We consider this assessment to be accurate and important both in terms of the general situation and the assessment of the conditions for free and fair elections.

Paragraph 10 of the Basic Agreement merits attention. It states that "the international community shall monitor and report on respect for human rights in the region on a long-term basis". In the interest of promoting security and trust, we consider that it should be more precisely defined which organizations will carry out this obligation on behalf of the international community and what forms their engagement and presence in the field will take after the expiration of the transitional period.

The question of full and lasting demilitarization of the region is of huge importance, as it represents an essential element for confidence-building among the population and the establishment of lasting stability. We are convinced that this question should be resolved exclusively from the point of view of the goals set forth in the Basic Agreement signed at Erdut and confidence-building among the population of the region. Although the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has a lasting commitment towards good-neighbourly relations, there are no grounds to link this issue with its bilateral relations with the Republic of Croatia, and even less to involve Hungary in it, as it would overstep the framework and goals of the Basic Agreement.

Allow me, in the end, to put forward the Yugoslav position that the Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, signed at Erdut, has a lasting character, that it is not formally limited in time; that is to say, that its validity extends even after the expiration of the two-year transitional period. This stems from the contents and goals of the Agreement, which can hardly be time-limited. Paragraph 10 of the Agreement, for example, provides that "the international community shall monitor and report on respect for human rights in the region on a long-term basis" even after the expiration of the transitional period. Paragraph 11 provides for the establishment of a commission to monitor the implementation of the provisions on human and civil rights on a long-term basis. The provision on the Council of Serbian Municipalities and the provision on the equality of all residents in the region also have a permanent character, which is a precondition for the preservation and development of the region as a multi-ethnic entity.

I would appreciate it if you would inform the members of the Security Council of the contents of the present letter.

(Signed) Milan MILUTINOVIĆ

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/79
27 January 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 501 (1982) of 25 February 1982, 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982, 509 (1982) of 6 June 1982 and 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982, as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 20 January 1997 (S/1997/42) and taking note of the observations expressed and the commitments mentioned therein,

Taking note of the letter dated 17 January 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/1997/41),

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. Decides to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further period of six months, that is until 31 July 1997;

2. Reiterates its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. Re-emphasizes the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978 (S/12611), approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

4. Condemns all acts of violence committed in particular against the Force, and urges the parties to put an end to them;

5. Reiterates that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

6. Encourages further efficiency and savings provided they do not affect the operational capacity of the Force;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned with the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon.

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S/1997/80
26 January 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON SIERRA LEONE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the letter dated 17 December 1996 (S/1996/1050), by which the President of the Security Council expressed the support of the Council for the proposal of my predecessor to send an assessment team to Sierra Leone in order to develop recommendations on ways in which the United Nations could assist in the implementation of the Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone signed at Abidjan on 30 November 1996 (S/1996/1034, annex).

2. The Assessment Team, working under the guidance and overall authority of my Special Envoy for Sierra Leone, Mr. Berhanu Dinka, was led by Brigadier-General Yogesh K. Saksena, Deputy Force Commander of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III). It arrived in Sierra Leone on 22 December 1996 and returned to New York on 6 January 1997. During its stay in the area, the team met officials of the Government of Sierra Leone, both in Freetown and in the northern and eastern provinces, as well as with representatives of United Nations agencies, members of the diplomatic community and non-governmental organizations. The team was received by President Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah on 27 December 1996. On 2 January, my Special Envoy and General Saksena travelled to Abidjan, where they met the Foreign Minister of Côte d'Ivoire, Mr. Amara Essy. On 3 January, they met the leader of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh.

3. The present report reflects the findings of the Assessment Team and its recommendations regarding the assistance the United Nations could extend to the parties in implementing the Abidjan Accord.

II. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABIDJAN ACCORD

4. Several encouraging developments have occurred during the past year in Sierra Leone. The holding of parliamentary and presidential elections in February and March 1996 resulted in the inauguration of a new Government on 29 March. While these elections and their results were not accepted by the RUF, on 25 March, representatives of the outgoing Government and the RUF entered into

a ceasefire agreement. They also agreed that negotiations for a comprehensive settlement of the conflict should take place between the new Government and the RUF. Such negotiations began in earnest shortly thereafter, with the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Commonwealth acting as facilitators. These negotiations culminated in the signing of the Abidjan Accord on 30 November, marking the end of five years of civil war.

5. The Abidjan Accord addressed the roots of the conflict by providing a framework to further the process of democratization and equitable social and economic development in Sierra Leone. Under the Accord, the parties declared an immediate end to the armed conflict and reaffirmed their commitment to observing the ceasefire and to undertaking every effort to ensure the full implementation of its provisions.

6. The political provisions of the Accord stipulate inter alia, that immediately following the signing of the Accord, the RUF will commence to function as a political movement and that the necessary conditions will be created to enable it to register as a political party. They also include the provision of amnesty for members of the RUF and the release of any prisoners of war. The Accord provides measures to encourage the consolidation of a fair and representative political process, including the holding of Citizens Consultative Conferences and the reconstitution of the National Elections Commission. In addition, it addresses the necessity to ensure respect for human rights; the promotion of a professional code of ethics and eradication of all forms of nepotism and corruption; as well as strengthening of the judiciary and vetting of the national police.

7. The military provisions of the Accord call for the disarmament and demobilization of RUF combatants; the downsizing and restructuring of the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF); the withdrawal of the private security firm, Executive Outcomes; and steps to bring about the withdrawal of foreign forces from the country in a manner consistent with existing treaty obligations.

8. In accordance with the Abidjan Accord, the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP) held its first session at Freetown on 19 December 1996. The Commission, which is comprised of four representatives of the Government of Sierra Leone and four representatives of the RUF, is to act as a verification mechanism responsible for supervising and monitoring the implementation of and compliance with all the provisions of the Agreement. In accordance with the Agreement, the Commission is to establish a Joint Monitoring Group and a Demobilization and Resettlement Committee, composed of representatives of the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF, to monitor the withdrawal of forces and the disarmament of combatants and to coordinate the encampment, disarmament, demobilization and resettlement of the RUF combatants, respectively.

9. The Assessment Team reviewed with their interlocutors the type of assistance that the United Nations, in cooperation with OAU and the Commonwealth, could provide to facilitate the implementation of the Abidjan Accord. The team emphasized that it would be imperative for the parties to abide by a strict timetable in implementing the Peace Agreement, noting that its

political provisions must be carried out hand in hand with its military provisions, so as to create the confidence necessary to proceed with the peace process. In this connection, the Team provided to the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, for its consideration, a draft timetable for the implementation of the Accord (see annex I).

10. The Abidjan Accord stipulated that the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, the United Nations, OAU and the Commonwealth would act as moral guarantors that its provisions are implemented by the parties with integrity and in good faith. Following the signing of the Peace Agreement, the President of Sierra Leone and the leader of the RUF wrote to the United Nations, OAU and the Commonwealth requesting their assistance in the implementation of the Peace Agreement.

11. On 2 January 1997, I wrote to the Secretaries-General of OAU and the Commonwealth to inform them that in response to the request of the parties to the United Nations, I had dispatched an Assessment Team to Sierra Leone. I also informed them that I would share with them the findings of the Assessment Team, with a view to developing a concerted programme of action by the United Nations, OAU and the Commonwealth. I invited them, in the meantime, to share with the United Nations their views on how they saw the role of their respective organizations in support of the peace process in Sierra Leone.

12. In this connection, I met with the Secretary-General of OAU, Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, on 16 January. Mr. Salim expressed the view that the international community should proceed quickly in assisting the parties to implement the Abidjan Accord and that the United Nations should take the lead role in that regard. He felt that assistance from OAU for the peace process should be coordinated by the United Nations.

13. In a letter dated 10 January 1997, the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, Chief Emeka Anyaoku, informed me that in response to the request from the parties, he had written to the eight members of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group on the Harare Declaration to ascertain their interest in providing personnel to assist in the implementation of the Accord under the auspices of the United Nations. A number of Commonwealth countries had indicated that any decision in that regard would be taken in light of the type of assistance to be provided by the United Nations for the implementation of the Accord.

14. In a meeting on 27 December, the President of Sierra Leone assured my Special Envoy and the Assessment Team of the full commitment of his Government to ensuring the timely implementation of the Abidjan Accord and to providing its full cooperation to the United Nations in that regard. He reaffirmed this commitment in a letter to me dated 16 January 1997.

15. On 3 January, my Special Envoy and members of the Assessment Team met Corporal Foday Sankoh, the leader of the RUF. Corporal Sankoh assured the Team that he was committed to the peace process and welcomed the support of the United Nations, in cooperation with OAU and the Commonwealth, in the implementation of the Abidjan Accord. He stated, however, that he could not discuss those issues in detail in the presence of my Special Envoy, whose neutrality he questioned. Despite the best efforts of my Special Envoy and the

Assessment Team, and the intervention of the Foreign Minister of Côte d'Ivoire, Corporal Sankoh could not be persuaded to discuss the implementation of the Agreement before the Team's departure from Abidjan.

16. In a letter addressed to me dated 13 January, Corporal Sankoh indicated that he wished to discuss the modalities for the implementation of the Abidjan Accord, including the deployment of neutral international observers, with its moral guarantors. He also requested that the international community assist not only in the implementation of the military provisions of the Accord, but also in its political provisions, including in the transformation of the RUF into a political party. Corporal Sankoh felt, however, that there was no need for a traditional peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone, as long as other military groups were demilitarized before the RUF started to disarm and demobilize. He thus appeared to question the sequence of implementation for some of the provisions of the Accord. However, in a second letter to me dated 17 January, Corporal Sankoh confirmed his willingness to receive neutral international monitors, as provided for in the Accord, and to cooperate fully with them in their work.

III. PRESENT SECURITY SITUATION IN SIERRA LEONE

17. Over the past five years, the strength of the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) grew from a total of about 3,000 to approximately 13,000, all ranks. Many of the troops recruited in recent years did not have the advantage of formal military training. As a result, some elements in the army have not always shown the necessary discipline. During the last period of the conflict, the former Government engaged a private security firm, Executive Outcomes, to train its security forces and assist its efforts against the RUF. This firm was maintained by the new Government. In addition, in the months before the signing of the Abidjan Accord, village-based hunters, known as Kamajors, were organized by paramount chiefs to protect their villages, mostly against looting from both the RUF and undisciplined RSLMF elements. The Government estimates the number of Kamajors, who are armed mainly with light weapons, to be approximately 2,500. Reports have been received, however, that Kamajors are still being recruited; their actual number could, therefore, be somewhat higher than the Government's current estimates.

18. While precise figures on the size of the RUF are not available, its strength is estimated at approximately 5,000 armed and 5,000 non-armed combatants. The RUF forces are concentrated mainly in the eastern and central parts of the country around Mekeni, Bo and Kenema, as well as at Kailahun and Bradford (see annex III). During the course of the conflict, the RUF employed small arms, light machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, which were reportedly pooled and distributed to combatants only during times of actual fighting.

19. With the signing of the Abidjan Accord on 30 November 1996, both the RSLMF and the RUF have been ordered to refrain from hostile action, remain confined to their current locations and dismantle roadblocks. The Kamajors have also been requested to refrain from hostile action against the RUF. While the ceasefire has generally held, the overall security situation in Sierra Leone remains

somewhat tenuous. Since 30 November, there have been some clashes between the various forces, as armed elements have left their bases in search of food and medicine. National police are deployed at the district level to provide security, but their effectiveness is severely hampered by manpower and logistic constraints.

20. The main security concern at present involves the situation at Kailahun, a district largely controlled by the RUF, which has become somewhat tense, as displaced persons, supported by Kamajors, have insisted upon returning to their homes to harvest their crops. The Government and the RUF have made efforts to defuse the tensions in Kailahun and other areas by seeking ways to provide food to combatants and displaced persons. Nevertheless, recent reports indicate that the Kamajors have overrun Kailahun town and pushed RUF elements toward Koindu. According to these reports, the Government has deployed RSLMF troops to protect the town, pending the encampment and disarmament of RUF elements in the area.

21. The Abidjan Accord foresees not only the disarmament and demobilization of RUF, but the downsizing of the RSLMF and the withdrawal of foreign forces from the country. As the peace process unfolds, and as demobilized RUF and RSLMF elements, as well as displaced persons and refugees, begin to resettle into their home communities, the security situation in the country will continue to be a matter of concern. In order to defuse tensions, efforts will have to be made to address continued feelings of hostility between former adversaries, as well as among civilians who suffered human rights abuses during the conflict. It will also be imperative that resettlement assistance for all groups is in place, so that those with no secure means of livelihood are given the opportunity to find employment and are not enticed into banditry.

22. Prior to the signing of the Abidjan Accord, the Government established a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme Unit within the Ministry of National Reconstruction, Resettlement and Rehabilitation (MNRRR). This Unit is responsible for preparing and implementing a demobilization and resettlement plan for RUF combatants. The MNRRR disarmament and demobilization plan recommends the establishment and management by non-governmental organizations, with the assistance of United Nations agencies, of four assembly sites at Bo, Kenema, Mekeni and Mile 38. The plan envisions that RUF combatants would be disarmed by a local security force, under the observation and monitoring of neutral international observers, and then encamped, pending either their return to civilian life, their integration into the RSLMF and other government services, or the provision of training and other assistance to help them resettle.

23. While this plan has been fully agreed with the concerned United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, which would assist in its implementation, it has not yet been discussed with the RUF. It is expected that once the Demobilization and Resettlement Committee of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace is established, the plan will be finalized. Nevertheless, neither the provision of security for the sites, nor the mechanism for disarming RUF combatants and reintegrating them into civilian life, have yet been satisfactorily addressed.

24. In this connection, the Government informed the Assessment Team that, in its view, the handing over of weapons to either the RSLMF or the Kamajors would not be acceptable to the RUF, nor would it be acceptable to the RUF if either of these forces were charged with the provision of security for assembly sites. The Government had therefore considered the possibility of using the Special Security Division (SSD) of the national police to carry out these responsibilities. The Government informed the Assessment Team, however, that it did not have the logistic or financial resources necessary for SSD to carry out this task. Furthermore, SSD did not have the manpower to take it on without redeploying units from their present security duties, thus diminishing its capacity to fulfil its day-to-day law enforcement responsibilities. Finally, the Government was not sure that SSD, which had been involved in the conflict, would be acceptable to the RUF.

25. The full and timely implementation of the disarmament and demobilization plan is dependent not only on the necessary decisions being taken by the Demobilization and Resettlement Committee of CCP, but also on the provision of voluntary funding by donor Governments for the establishment and management of assembly sites and on finding a satisfactory solution with regard to the provision of security at the sites. To date, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has provided $1.5 million for disarmament and demobilization, which will cover the establishment and operation of three sites for a period of three months. These funds are projected to cover the cost of demobilizing 3,000 combatants. They do not, however, cover the costs of providing security at the sites.

26. It will be recalled that in their letters of 30 November and 9 December 1996 to my predecessor (S/1996/1049, annexes I and II), the parties requested the United Nations to provide neutral international observers to monitor the peace process. The Assessment Team determined, however, that a capable security presence would also be required to deter undisciplined elements from impeding the peace process. Such a presence would help to provide the confidence necessary for the RUF to leave its bases, turn over its arms and demobilize; for the RSLMF to withdraw to barracks; and for the Kamajors to return to their villages and traditional roles.

27. The Government has indicated, however, that it does not at present have the means to ensure an adequate security presence for encampment and disarmament. Accordingly, after a careful review, the Assessment Team concluded that the required tasks could not be carried out by a mission composed only of unarmed military observers. The Team felt, however, that, under the present conditions in Sierra Leone, a peacekeeping operation, combining military observers with a limited number of formed troops, would be able to assist the parties to implement the Abidjan Accord effectively. The role of such a mission and its concept of operations are set out in annex II. The related cost estimates will be issued shortly as an addendum to the present report.

IV. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

28. The five-year conflict in Sierra Leone resulted in the displacement of over 1.6 million people, of a total pre-war population estimated at 4.5 million. Of

these, only 210,000 took refuge in displaced persons camps. The rest sought the safety of district towns, placing tremendous pressure on social services. The conflict also resulted in the destruction of schools, health facilities, water supply systems and transport infrastructure, mostly in the rural areas. On the economic front, Sierra Leone witnessed a serious deterioration in performance and the erosion of an already weak productive capacity.

29. Over the past year, conditions in war-affected areas of Sierra Leone have slowly evolved to reflect the improved security situation. In recent months, at least 100,000 displaced people, including 45,000 who were living in camps, have spontaneously returned to their areas of origin, primarily in Pujehun district in the Southern Province of Sierra Leone. Relief agencies now have greater access to a wider territory and are beginning to provide assistance in the form of food and non-food items for resettlement at the community level. Nevertheless, insecure conditions continue to impede resettlement in some areas.

30. The total number of Sierra Leonean refugees in asylum countries in the subregion is approximately 361,000, of whom 232,000 are in Guinea, 123,000 in Liberia and 6,000 in other countries. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that 289,000 Sierra Leonean refugees will opt to repatriate, and it is preparing a repatriation programme to facilitate their voluntary return in conditions of safety and dignity. The implementation of this programme will depend on security and other conditions in the country.

31. To meet the emergency humanitarian needs of the war-affected population, especially those who are displaced, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs issued a one-year consolidated appeal for Sierra Leone in March 1996, followed by an update in September 1996. Of the $57.8 million requested in the appeal, $37.2 million has been pledged to date.

32. In April 1996, the Government of Sierra Leone created the Ministry of National Reconstruction, Resettlement and Rehabilitation to oversee and coordinate humanitarian assistance and post-war recovery efforts. The Ministry took the lead in developing the National Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme, which was launched at a round table meeting in September 1996 sponsored by the Government of Sierra Leone, the United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank.

33. The National Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme is designed to address the short-term needs of demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, resettlement of displaced people and refugees, and restoration of basic social services, as well as the medium-term reconstruction necessary to lay the foundation for long-term growth and development. While donors pledged approximately $232 million at the round-table meeting, only a small percentage of these pledges have been received to date, severely limiting implementation of the Programme.

34. The World Bank is in the process of finalizing an Emergency Recovery and Reintegration Credit in support of the Government's National Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme. A large portion of this $15 million credit will fund community-based assistance for the resettlement of ex-combatants, displaced people and refugees and for the restoration of basic

social services and infrastructure in war-affected areas. While most funds from the Credit will not be available in-country until the second half of this year, some grants will be made available by the end of February 1997 for pilot projects in resettlement, veterans assistance and institutional support to the Ministry of National Reconstruction, Resettlement and Rehabilitation. The European Union will also provide support to resettlement by funding projects related to food security, water and sanitation and rehabilitation of infrastructure, among others.

35. As regards the resettlement of ex-combatants, to date the Government has screened some 1,500 RUF elements who have spontaneously demobilized. However, only 200 of them were classified as ex-combatants in accordance with Government criteria. The vast majority of these former RUF members have since returned to their areas of origin. Since demobilization has only been undertaken on an ad hoc basis up to now, there are no currently active official programmes for the resettlement of ex-combatants.

V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

36. The people of Sierra Leone have suffered greatly over the five years of conflict in their country. The economy has been weakened and administrative structures remain fragile. Unless the needs of the war-affected are addressed promptly and effectively, the security situation in the country could again deteriorate. Nevertheless, there is a strong desire on the part of the civilian population for peace and the creation of conditions that would enable them to look forward to a better future. Furthermore, the physical infrastructure, civil administration and social fabric of Sierra Leone have not been extensively affected by the conflict. United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations and international financial institutions are presently putting in place programmes to assist in the implementation of the resettlement and rehabilitation plans. These efforts are essential to the consolidation of peace in Sierra Leone.

37. The achievement of a durable peace does not depend only on the successful demobilization and resettlement of RUF combatants. It also depends on the establishment of a professional national army. In this connection, the Government has committed itself, under the Abidjan Accord, to downsizing and restructuring the RSLMF and to strengthening the civilian police, so that it can effectively carry out its responsibilities. The downsizing of the RSLMF will be a sensitive endeavour. The Government has therefore requested the assistance of the United Nations in developing a plan for demobilizing and restructuring the RSLMF and monitoring the withdrawal to barracks of those units not required for normal security duties.

38. In order to create a climate of confidence conducive to the demobilization and reintegration of RUF forces, I would also urge the Government to consider the adoption of appropriate measures to ensure the return of the Kamajors to their villages and traditional roles. The success of the disarmament and demobilization process will also depend upon combatants knowing that they have some means of supporting themselves once they give up their arms. I therefore

urge donors to ensure that the assistance they have pledged to support the reintegration process is made available as soon as possible.

39. The success of any peacekeeping operation depends first and foremost on the clear consent of the parties and on their commitment to cooperate fully with one another and with the United Nations in the implementation of the agreements they have freely entered into. By signing the Abidjan Accord, the parties to the conflict have committed themselves to a negotiated settlement. The Government of Sierra Leone confirmed to the Assessment Team its readiness to ensure the timely implementation of the Accord and to extend its full cooperation to a United Nations peacekeeping operation as described in annex II to the present report. As explained in paragraphs 15 and 16 above, while it was not possible for the Assessment Team to get the same assurances from the RUF before it left Abidjan, I have received from Corporal Sankoh two letters, dated 13 and 17 January respectively. In his second letter, Corporal Sankoh confirmed his willingness to receive the peace monitors foreseen under the Abidjan Accord and to cooperate fully with them. In the light of that letter, I am taking steps to bring to the attention of Corporal Sankoh the concept of operations described in annex II to the present report. At the earliest opportunity, I shall then submit to the Council the appropriate recommendations regarding the establishment of a peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone.

40. In concluding, I should like to commend my Special Envoy, the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, OAU and the Commonwealth for the assistance they have provided to the parties in facilitating a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Sierra Leone. I would also like to express my gratitude to the Foreign Minister of Côte d'Ivoire for the invaluable assistance and support he provided to the Assessment Team during its stay in Abidjan.

ANNEX I

Abidjan Peace Accord

Proposed schedule of implementation

30 November 1996	Peace Agreement signed in Abidjan
	RUF to begin functioning as a political movement (art. 13)
14 December 1996	CCP established (art. 3)
14 December 1996 to D-Day	CCP establishes subcommittees (arts. 3, 6 and 11)
	- Joint Monitoring Group (JMG)
	- Demobilization and Resettlement Committee (DRC)
	CCP finalizes schedule of implementation
	CCP determines location of assembly sites in consultation with the United Nations
	The Government of Sierra Leone informs the RUF of the steps necessary to register as a political party (art. 13)
	The Government grants amnesty to the RUF and defines the steps requires to adopt related legislation (art. 14)
	The Government defines the steps and timing necessary to establish the Office of the Ombudsman (art. 16)
	CCP finalizes the disarmament and demobilization plan in consultation with the United Nations
	CCP and concerned agencies commence/continue work on operational aspects of the disarmament and demobilization plan, including the establishment of assembly sites in three areas and the intensification of the sensitization campaign
	RUF registers as a political party
	RUF prepares combatants to move to assembly sites
D-Day	The Security Council authorizes the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation to assist the parties in the implementation of the Abidjan Accord
D-Day + 1	The United Nations establishes a trust fund for the consolidation of peace

D-Day + 7

Deployment of the advance United Nations Headquarters/ military observer group begins

The Government adopts amnesty legislation and establishes the Office of the Ombudsman

D-Day + 14

The United Nations peacekeeping operation/JMG finalize joint working procedures, including for, inter alia:

- Observation/verification of the ceasefire and reporting/ investigating alleged violations;
- Observation/verification of disarmament and demobilization;
- Supervision/verification of confinement to barracks and withdrawal of Executive Outcomes

The United Nations/CCP and concerned agencies update operational plans for demobilization/resettlement and related issues

CCP establishes additional subcommittees (art. 3)

- Socio-Economic Forum (also art. 27)
- Citizens' Consultative Conference
- Multi-partisan Council
- National Budget and Debt Committee

D-Day + 15

The United Nations/JMG commence formal observation and monitoring of the ceasefire

Joint United Nations/JMG groups begin deployment to assembly sites, established by the Government, depending on security conditions

Executive Outcomes confined to barracks under United Nations/JMG Supervision (art. 12)

United Nations/CCP commence discussions on return of the RSLMF to barracks (art. 10)

The Government begins consultations with political parties on the reconstitution of the National Elections Commission (art. 18)

D-Day + 17

Disarmament/encampment of the RUF commences under government auspices, with United Nations/JMG observation and verification

D-Day + 30	The United Nations begins an information campaign, based on local radio, focusing on the peace process, in particular the disarmament, demobilization and resettlement
	Executive Outcomes withdraws under United Nations/JMG supervision and verification (art. 12)
	GOSL establishes the Human Rights Commission (art. 20)
	First Citizens' Consultative Conference (art. 4)
D-Day + 60	Deployment of United Nations troops begins
D-Day + 75	Disarmament/encampment of the RUF commences under United Nations auspices, with United Nations/JMG observation and verification
D-Day + 75 to D-Day + 240	The Government releases all political prisoners and prisoners of war (art. 19)
	The Government repatriates foreign troops in accordance with existing treaty obligations (art. 12)
	The United Nations and the Government finalize the schedule of withdrawal to barracks and demobilization plans for the RSLMF
	National Unity and Reconciliation Commission expanded (art. 15)
	Disarmament/encampment of the RUF, under United Nations monitoring and verification, completed
	RSLMF commence withdrawal to barracks under United Nations monitoring and verification (art. 12)
	Demobilization of excess RSLMF troops commences
D-Day + 240	United Nations mandate completed

ANNEX II

Concept of operations

1. Should the Security Council, on the basis of possible recommendations by the Secretary-General, decide to authorize an operation on the basis of the Assessment Team's findings, the following concept of operations is envisaged. This approach is based on the assumption that the parties are committed to the peace process and prepared to cooperate fully with one another and the United Nations to ensure its timely implementation.

A. Political role

2. The United Nations would use its good offices, in cooperation with OAU and the Commonwealth, to facilitate the implementation of both the political and military provisions of the Accord. To this end, the United Nations would have observer status at the meetings of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace. It would hold regular joint meetings with the leaders of the CCP delegations of both parties to consult directly with them on progress in the implementation of the peace process and to provide advice on measures to be taken to promote the timely implementation of the provisions of the Abidjan Accord. The United Nations would also consult the other moral guarantors to the Accord on a regular basis.

3. In addition, any United Nations operation in Sierra Leone would include a public information unit to ensure that objective and factual information on the peace process, as well as on the United Nations role in Sierra Leone, is disseminated widely throughout the country. The unit would focus, in particular, on providing information to combatants to encourage them to give up their arms and return to civilian life.

4. Experience has shown that the parties to a peace agreement often require logistic or financial support to be able to fulfil their responsibilities in its implementation. It would therefore be my intention to establish a Trust Fund for the Consolidation of Peace in Sierra Leone. The United Nations would thus be in a position, subject to the availability of the necessary funds, to assist both parties in the many aspects of the peace process which are critical to its success, but for which resources would not be provided under an assessed budget. Contributions to the Trust Fund would be used, inter alia, to support the work of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, the Joint Monitoring Group and the Demobilization and Resettlement Committee, especially in terms of the logistic resources necessary for them to carry out their responsibilities. Voluntary contributions to the Trust Fund would also be used to assist the transformation of the RUF into a political party and for civic activities in support of the peace process.

B. Military role

5. As noted earlier, the Government of Sierra Leone has undertaken some initial planning to facilitate the implementation of disarmament and demobilization. These plans, and the resources provided for them, only partially meet the requirements of the Peace Agreement. Nevertheless, the Government and the RUF should proceed as quickly as possible with the finalization and implementation of these plans. United Nations involvement in the implementation of the military provisions of the Abidjan Accord would be designed in such a way as to support the efforts of the parties. Hence, the first stage of deployment would include military observers, who would assist the parties in observing and monitoring the ceasefire and disarmament at assembly sites established by the Government. The second stage of deployment would include formed troops, which would be tasked primarily with the establishment of, and provision of security for, those assembly sites which the Government was not in a position to establish during the first stage.

6. In this connection, immediately following a Security Council decision to establish a United Nations operation in Sierra Leone, an advance Headquarters and military observer group would be deployed to the country. The first task of these personnel would be to undertake preparations for the setting up of a force headquarters and, in accordance with the provisions of the Abidjan Accord, to develop working procedures, in consultation with the Joint Monitoring Group, for monitoring and verification of the ceasefire, investigating alleged violations of the ceasefire, monitoring and verifying disarmament and demobilization, as well as the confinement to barracks, and eventual withdrawal from the country, of Executive Outcomes. Teams of six military observers each would be deployed to each assembly site established by the Government, depending upon the provision of adequate security.

7. The United Nations would also assist the Government to develop a plan for the downsizing of the RSLMF and would monitor the withdrawal to barracks of RSLMF forces not required for normal security duties. In addition, if requested, United Nations military observers would monitor and verify the withdrawal of foreign troops from Sierra Leone.

8. Formed troops would be deployed about 60 days after the deployment of the Headquarters and military observer group. Prior to the date of their deployment, I would undertake a careful review of developments on the ground and make any adjustments to the deployment plan which may be necessary. This review would be based on the ability of the Government to establish assembly sites and provide security for them. In this connection, if the Government is in a position to establish and secure some assembly sites, the total requirement for United Nations troops would decrease accordingly. The deployment plan would also be refined on the basis of more precise data on the exact number of RUF combatants, their locations and their weapons and ammunition. In any event, the number of troops would not exceed 720 all ranks, including support elements.

9. United Nations troops would assist in the establishment of, and provision of security for, assembly sites, and take custody of the arms and ammunition handed over by RUF combatants. They would also provide security for the transportation of RUF combatants to assembly sites. Subject to a decision by

CCP in this regard, United Nations troops would also supervise the destruction of weapons collected. In addition, the troops would provide security for United Nations personnel and property in areas where they are deployed.

10. The troops would include three infantry companies of 100 all ranks each, which would be deployed at three assembly sites (300 all ranks). These units would also carry out disarmament at up to three additional temporary sites. A reserve infantry company would be stationed at Freetown (100 all ranks). The Force would also include engineering (32 all ranks), transport (40 all ranks) and medical detachments (20 all ranks), a motorized infantry platoon (40 all ranks), battalion support personnel (139 all ranks) and headquarters staff (49 all ranks).

11. A total of 60 military observers would be required. As noted earlier, the observers would be deployed in teams of six at each of the three assembly sites to observe, monitor and verify disarmament and demobilization, as well as the ceasefire. Teams of five observers each would also be deployed at Bo, Kabala, Kailahun, Koidu and Pujehun to monitor and verify the ceasefire. Two mobile teams of five observers each will be deployed at Freetown.

12. As indicated in annex I to the present report, the military tasks would be completed within eight months of a Security Council decision to authorize a United Nations operation in Sierra Leone. In summary, these tasks would include the following:

(a) Monitoring and verifying the ceasefire and investigating reported violations thereof;

(b) Monitoring and verifying the confinement to barracks of Executive Outcomes and, subsequently, its withdrawal from the country;

(c) Monitoring and verifying the disarmament and demobilization of RUF combatants;

(d) Assisting in the establishment of assembly sites and providing security for them, as well as for weapons handed over by the RUF;

(e) Monitoring the withdrawal to barracks of RSLMF troops not required for normal security duties and assisting the Government in developing a plan for their demobilization;

(f) If so requested, monitoring and verifying the withdrawal of foreign troops from Sierra Leone;

(g) Providing security for United Nations personnel and property.

13. In order to fulfil the above tasks in a timely manner, United Nations personnel must be operational from the very start of the mission. However, owing to the lead time required, under existing rules and regulations, to contract the necessary civilian administrative support, it would take several months to establish the necessary logistic and administrative infrastructure for the operation. Therefore, the initial logistic requirements of the mission

would be covered by a military logistics unit, which would contain transport, supply, communications and engineering capability. This military unit would be gradually reduced as United Nations civilian administrative support becomes operational. The total military strength of the mission would not, at any time, exceed the 720, all ranks, indicated in paragraph 8 above.

14. Air support for the operation, consisting of two medium-lift helicopters, would be provided by a civilian contractor. With regard to vehicles, only 40 of the required number would be available from the United Nations global fleet. Steps are being taken to ensure that they are provided in a timely manner. Additional vehicle requirements will be covered by local rental and purchase, as necessary.

C. Organizational structure

15. Should the Security Council decide to establish such an operation, it would be headed by a Special Representative and its headquarters would be located in Freetown. The Special Representative would have an office headed by a Director and composed of a small number of Political Affairs Officers. The office of the Special Representative would also include a Legal Officer, a Human Rights Officer and a public information unit. In addition, the Mission's headquarters would include personnel who would assist in the establishment and operation of the assembly sites, in cooperation with the United Nations resident coordinator. The military component of the operation would be headed by a Force Commander. The Mission would also have an administrative component, headed by a Chief Administrative Officer.

16. The Special Representative, acting on my behalf, would exercise executive authority over all aspects of the operation, which would be carried out in accordance with the overall time-frame set out in annex I to the present report and completed within eight months of a decision by the Security Council to authorize it. The Special Representative would also be responsible for the coordination of all United Nations activities geared to the furtherance of the peace process in Sierra Leone.

Annex III



SIERRA LEONE

- National capital
- Provincial capital
- Town, village
- International boundary
- Provincial boundary
- Major road
- Secondary road
- Railroad
- Airport

Map No. 3902 Rev. 2 UNITED NATIONS
January 1997

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31 January 1997

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON SIERRA LEONE

Addendum

1. With reference to paragraph 27 of my main report (S/1997/80), I wish to inform the Security Council that the establishment and maintenance of a peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone for the eight-month period, on a full-cost basis derived from the proposed schedule of implementation of the Abidjan Accord and the concept of operations as set out in annexes I and II to my report, is projected at some $47 million. This includes approximately $16.6 million in non-recurrent costs, most of which relate to the emplacement and the repatriation of military and civilian personnel and equipment, as well as the establishment of three additional temporary assembly sites. The recurrent maintenance cost of the operation amounts to approximately $30.2 million and provides for the support of up to 720 formed troops, 60 military observers and 276 civilian staff.

2. A breakdown of the estimated costs by main categories of expenditure is provided, for information purposes, in the annex to the present report.

3. Should it become necessary to modify the implementation schedule and concept of operations described in annexes I and II to my main report, I shall inform the Security Council of any changes in the cost estimates for the operation.

4. It would be my intention to propose to the General Assembly, should the Security Council decide to establish a peacekeeping operation as envisaged in annex II to my report, that the costs relating thereto should be considered an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and that the assessments to be levied on Member States should be credited to the special account to be established for the operation in Sierra Leone.

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Annex

Cost estimates for the United Nations operation in Sierra Leone for the eight-month period

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	Non-recurrent costs	Recurrent costs	Total cost
1. Military personnel costs	2 400	12 240	14 640
2. Civilian personnel costs	520	10 960	11 480
3. Premises/accommodation	445	565	1 010
4. Infrastructure repairs	450	-	450
5. Transport operations	2 070	1 150	3 220
6. Air operations	100	1 225	1 325
7. Naval operations	-	-	-
8. Communications	1 220	780	2 000
9. Other equipment	2 630	-	2 630
10. Supplies and services	-	1 375	1 375
11. Election-related supplies and services	-	-	-
12. Public information programmes	5	255	260
13. Training programmes	-	-	-
14. Mine-clearing programmes	-	-	-
15. Assistance for disarmament and demobilization	950	-	950
16. Air and surface freight	5 860	-	5 860
17. Integrated Management Information System	-	-	-
18. Support account for peacekeeping operations	-	-	-
19. Staff assessment	-	1 600	1 600
Total, lines 1-19	16 650	30 150	46 800

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27 January 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 23 JANUARY 1997 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey the attached communication, dated 22 January 1997, which I have received from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

I should be grateful if you would bring it to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

97-02306 (E) 280197

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Annex

Letter dated 22 January 1997 from the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with Security Council resolution 1088 (1996), I attached the first monthly report on Stabilization Force (SFOR) operations. I would appreciate your making this report available to the Security Council.

Over the past month, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we have witnessed the successful transition from the Implementation Force (IFOR) to SFOR. Operation Joint Guard will enable SFOR to build on IFOR achievements and to contribute to a secure environment necessary for the consolidation and stabilization of peace in the region.

Overall, the situation in the theatre has been calm - ethnic tensions persist, however, and we in the international community cannot afford to underestimate the challenges ahead. As we face these challenges, I can assure you that SFOR will implement its mandate as professionally as IFOR, and it will play its full part in helping to bring lasting peace to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(Signed) Javier SOLANA

Appendix

Monthly report to the United Nations Security Council on SFOR operations

SFOR operations

1. Operation Joint Guard began on 20 December 1996, following the termination of Operation Joint Endeavour and the consequent transition from the Implementation Force (IFOR) to the Stabilization Force (SFOR). Under the authority of Security Council resolution 1088 (1996), SFOR will contribute to a secure environment necessary for the consolidation and stabilization of peace by deterring or, if necessary, halting a resumption of hostilities. It will also provide time for political reconciliation and economic reconstruction to gain momentum.

2. Currently, there are approximately 32,000 troops deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina with contributions from all the NATO nations and from the 18 non-NATO countries that participated in IFOR.[1] The new force is expected to be fully established by 3 February 1997, when the next phase of Operation Joint Guard, the stabilization phase, will begin.

3. Over the past month, the situation in the theatre has been calm, in part owing to the winter weather conditions. SFOR troops have conducted area reconnaissance and surveillance operations and inspected the authorized sites for heavy weapons and other forces.

4. The next major milestone in implementation of the Peace Agreement that may have an impact on SFOR operations will be the decision of the Brcko Arbitration Tribunal, expected on 15 February.

Cooperation and compliance by the parties

5. All parties remain in general compliance with the military provisions of the Peace Agreement. Individual breaches continue to occur, however. One cantonment violation was registered in early January, in a weapons site east of Banja Luka, with the removal by Bosnian Serbs of 450 rounds of 7.62 mm ammunition. Unauthorized weapons, mainly small arms, continue to be discovered and confiscated. In mid-January, SFOR troops disabled 11 multi-barrelled rocket launchers that had been confiscated from a Bosniac Government ordnance factory in Novi Travnik in December; the weapons will be destroyed shortly.

6. With respect to freedom of movement and freedom of return, SFOR has discovered and removed a small number of illegal checkpoints over the past month. The risk remains of incidents associated with the return of refugees and displaced persons into the zone of separation. SFOR will continue to work

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[1] Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Sweden and Ukraine.

closely with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Police Task Force (IPTF) and the Office of the High Representative (OHR) to permit the organized and safe return of refugees and displaced persons.

7. In addition, none of the parties is yet judged to be compliant with respect to demining, and mines continue to pose the greatest threat to civilians and troops alike. At a recent meeting of the Joint Military Commission, therefore, to reflect the importance of the demining issue, SFOR defined a reasonable rate of demining activity to be undertaken by the parties. Should targets not be met, additional training and movement restrictions will be imposed. To give impetus to this initiative, arrangements will be made to provide significant training assistance to each of the parties so as to enable them to establish a core of personnel trained in demining procedures. At the same meeting, arrangements were also set in motion for the consolidation of weapons in a reduced number of cantonment sites.

8. The Bosniac and Bosnian Serb parties are still non-compliant in the mandatory return of prisoners of war (POWs). The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) records 13 POWs still held in Bosniac and Serb prisons. It is also possible that there may be more POWs detained by the entities.

Cooperation with international organizations

9. SFOR support has been provided to IPTF in its inspection of civilian police stations. All parties have been seeking to store inappropriate weapons. To date, the joint inspections have resulted in the discovery and subsequent destruction by SFOR of approximately 115 mines, 40 anti-tank weapons, 100 machine-guns and over 350 rifles.

10. SFOR has also worked with IPTF to maintain local security. For example, in early January, following increased tension in the northeastern town of Dugi Dio between Bosniacs and Bosnian Serb police, SFOR and IPTF increased their presence in the area.

11. With a view to promoting freedom of movement, and in line with decisions taken at the December 1996 Peace Implementation Conference in London, SFOR is participating in a Freedom of Movement Task Force, set up with participants from OHR, IPTF and a number of countries. The Task Force meets weekly in Sarajevo.

12. SFOR continued to support OSCE in its role with respect to annex I B of the Peace Agreement, including through the recent delivery to the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office of updated data on the parties' weapons holdings in SFOR-authorized sites.

13. SFOR contains a Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Task Force of over 300 military personnel in theatre, which is providing selective support to OHR and other organizations responsible for implementing the civil aspects of the Peace Agreement. SFOR planners are now working closely with the OSCE Mission to determine requirements for the preparation and conduct of the municipal elections.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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S/1997/82
27 January 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 17 JANUARY 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE NETHERLANDS TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour, with reference to paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 883 (1993) and to the annex to document S/1996/606, to forward information with regard to the measures taken by the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to comply with the resolution.

The Netherlands measures to give effect to the financial sanctions against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on the basis of Security Council resolution 883 (1993) were implemented by Sanctions Order Payments and Financial Services Libya 1993, which entered into force on 5 December 1993. This order was replaced in 1994 by Sanctions Decree Payments and Financial Services Libya in accordance with the Act on Sanctions 1997. The decree entered into force on 29 September 1994.

With regard to measures in the field of trade, non-financial services and air traffic, sanctions were implemented by Sanctions Order Libya 1993, which entered into force on 5 December 1993. This order was replaced by Sanctions Decree Libya 1993 in accordance with the Act on Sanctions 1977. The decree entered into force on 29 September 1994.

Finally, for the sake of completeness, the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands refers to EEC regulation 3274/93 of the Council of Ministers of the European Community of 29 November 1993, in which the supply or delivery of certain goods and services to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya was prohibited.

Relevant national legislation is enclosed herewith.*

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* The text of this legislation is available for consultation in room S-3055.

97-02328 (E) 280197 290197

UNITED NATIONS **S**

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S/1997/83
28 January 1997

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LETTER DATED 28 JANUARY 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SUDAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions from my Government, I wish to transmit herewith a statement issued by the Ministry of External Relations of the Republic of the Sudan concerning the situation of civilian Sudanese captured by the Forces of the Tigray Government of Ethiopia and the suffering to which these innocent civilians were subjected. The savage attacks of the Tigrian forces resulted in the kidnapping of any Sudanese citizens who are now considered missing. The Tigrian forces has also taken back into the Ethiopian territory a large number of children and women as hostages. There is confirmed information and substantial evidence that these children and women are subjected to inhumane treatment including rape, torture and abuse.

I would like to request you to bring the contents of this letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council so that the appropriate measures to terminate the suffering of the Sudanese people by returning them back to their families are taken.

I also request that this letter and its annex be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Elfatih ERWA
Permanent Representative

97-02555 (E) 290197 290197

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Annex

[Original: Arabic]

Statement concerning the tragic plight of missing persons, detainees and prisoners with the Ethiopian Tigray forces attacking Sudanese territory

Since Ethiopian Tigray forces launched a criminal act of aggression against its eastern borders on 12 January 1997, the Sudan has been monitoring with deep concern the situation of large numbers of missing citizens of various ages. There are 3,000 to 4,000 of them, mostly women and school-age children.

The information available to the Sudanese authorities is that these citizens are in a cruel and appalling situation as a result of intimidation and coercion by Ethiopian Tigray forces in the area. They are also suffering from hunger, thirst and sickness through being forced to travel long distances on foot. Since the attack on the Sudan's eastern borders was launched, invading Ethiopian Tigray forces have been holding large numbers of citizens and preventing them from leaving the town of Kurmuk. These innocent people are being treated cruelly and savagely by the attacking forces.

In another development, eye-witness reports from citizens arriving at the town of Damazin in the southern part of Blue Nile province indicate that invading Ethiopian Tigray forces have captured 160 schoolchildren and 15 teachers. They also captured Mr. Ya'qub Husayn, governor of Kurmuk, whose ultimate fate remains unknown. In the meantime, the information that has reached the Sudanese authorities confirms that, more than a week after they were captured, Mr. Isma'il Mahmud, Secretary of the National Congress Secretariat, and Mr. Al-Rabi' Ahmad Karmano, head of the Kurmuk local council, were killed by the savage Ethiopian Tigray forces.

The Government of the Sudan presents these facts as confirmation that the attacking Ethiopian Tigray forces have clearly and blatantly violated the principles of international law and the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War in ways that have included the abduction of women and the rape and abuse of the women and children they have taken into Ethiopian territory. Given this appalling situation, we urge the international community, as represented by its specialized organizations and institutions and first and foremost by the Security Council, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the States signatories to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, to discharge their humanitarian responsibilities and obligations by condemning these most heinous violations committed by the criminal Ethiopian Tigray forces against the civilians and soldiers who have fallen victim to the brutal aggression launched on our eastern borders. We further call upon the international community and all its relevant institutions to meet their responsibility to halt these violations forthwith, to ensure the necessary protection for all missing persons, detainees and prisoners and to put an end to practices involving violence and threat of violence that have the basic purpose of spreading terror among the innocent civilian inhabitants of the

area and uprooting them. The Sudan urges the institutions entrusted with ensuring respect for international humanitarian law to institute an inquiry into the savage crimes committed by the Ethiopian Tigray forces against the innocent Sudanese prisoners and detainees in their possession, which have included physical liquidation, so that the perpetrators and war criminals implicated in these practices will not escape the justice of the law.

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-first session
Agenda item 58
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-second year

Letter dated 28 January 1997 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention new and serious Turkish actions in violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus. According to information received by the Republic of Cyprus and also to reports in the Turkish press, three warships of the Turkish Navy, namely a frigate Fatih and two gunboats Dogan and Gurbet, sailed on 25 January and docked at the closed port of Famagusta in the occupied part of Cyprus. The warships, according to Turkish press reports, are to remain in the port for a period of five days.

On behalf of my Government I wish to protest strongly these illegal actions, which are in violation of the principles and provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and preemptory norms of international law as well as United Nations resolutions, including binding decisions of the Security Council on Cyprus. Furthermore, following the Turkish invasion in 1974 and the occupation of a large part of territory of the Republic of Cyprus, the ports of Famagusta, Karavostasi and Kyrenia were declared closed by the Government to all vessels under law 265 of 3 October 1974.

I would like to stress that these Turkish actions are but the latest of a series of continuing provocative acts by Turkey against Cyprus, manifested by threats of the use of force against the Republic of Cyprus in statements made by key officials of the Turkish Government. These threats were most recently incorporated in the so-called "Joint Declaration" of 20 January 1997 between President Demirel of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Denktash.

97-02520 (E) 290197 300197

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I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 58, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) J. C. DROUSHIOTIS
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Deputy Permanent Representative
of the Republic of Cyprus
to the United Nations

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Security Council

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28 January 1997

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-first session
Agenda item 58
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-second year

Letter dated 28 January 1997 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention the so-called "Joint Declaration" between President S. Demirel of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. R. Denktash, issued at Ankara on 20 January 1997 and to strongly protest this latest illegal and provocative Turkish action.

The "Joint Declaration" is yet another manifestation of Turkey's continued violation of its international obligations, the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and United Nations resolutions on Cyprus, which have been committed since the 1974 Turkish invasion and continued military occupation of 37 per cent of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus.

More specifically, the signing itself of the Declaration with Mr. Denktash, purporting to act as "the President" of the so-called "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus", a secessionist entity in the occupied area of Cyprus, amounts to a flagrant violation of the 1960 Treaty of Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and the Treaty of Guarantee. It also violates Security Council resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984), by which the Council deplored and condemned the secessionist entity and all other secessionist actions, declaring them illegal and invalid and called upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, not to recognize any Cypriot State other than the Republic of Cyprus and not to facilitate or in any other way assist the said secessionist entity.

The threats contained in the "Joint Declaration", including, inter alia, that if the Republic of Cyprus continued with its defense programmes Turkey would retaliate with military and political measures, amount to a direct threat to use force against the Republic of Cyprus in violation of Article 2, paragraphs 4 and 7, and Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

The Republic of Cyprus is a sovereign State and a Member of the United Nations and it has the inalienable right to defend itself and the freedom to decide on its armaments.

The position entertained in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the "Joint Declaration" that the Republic of Cyprus is not a legal entity is yet another manifestation of the total disregard by Turkey of the numerous Security Council resolutions which call upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

The assertion that the Republic of Cyprus is not entitled to apply for membership with the European Union and proceed with the accession negotiations is legally unfounded and totally outside the letter and the spirit of the international treaties of 1960.

In any way Turkey is estopped from relying on the said treaties, which it has been grossly violating since 1974.

The position entertained in the "Joint Declaration" that the achievement of a just and lasting settlement will not be in reach so long as, inter alia, the "sovereign rights of the Turkish Cypriot people are not recognized" stands in blatant violation of the above-mentioned treaties and the Security Council resolutions on Cyprus, in particular paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 939 (1994), by which the Council reaffirmed its position that "a Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and comprising two politically equal communities as described in the relevant Security Council resolutions in a bicommunal and bizonal federation, and that such a settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession".

It should also be pointed out that any action taken by Turkey within the context of paragraph 13 of the said "Declaration" in an attempt to promote the illegal entity in the Turkish occupied area, would amount to a violation of the Security Council resolutions on Cyprus, in particular resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984).

With regard to the assertion that economic relations between Turkey and the so-called "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" will be expanded within the framework of the comprehensive "Economic Protocol" signed on 3 January 1997 between Turkey and the so-called "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus", the Government of Cyprus wishes to reiterate its position that such agreements are void ab initio, as they contravene the said resolutions on Cyprus, as well as the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

With regard to the position put forward in the "Joint Declaration" that the failure to reach a solution to the Cyprus problem is due to the intransigence of the Greek Cypriot side, the Government of Cyprus wishes to refer to the statement of the then Secretary-General, contained in his report to the Security Council of 30 May 1994 (S/1994/629), that the absence of progress is due to the lack of political will on the Turkish Cypriot side.

On the contrary, the Government of Cyprus once again expresses its sincere wish that a just and viable solution to the Cyprus problem, based on United Nations resolutions, is reached as soon as possible.

In conclusion, the Government of the Republic of Cyprus wishes to reiterate its position that the said "Joint Declaration" and the provisions contained therein are legally invalid and of no effect whatsoever.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 58, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) J. C. DROUSHIOTIS
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Deputy Permanent Representative
of the Republic of Cyprus
to the United Nations

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Security Council

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S/1997/86
28 January 1997
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 27 JANUARY 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 25 January 1997 addressed to you by Mr. Mohammed Said Al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, concerning the Government of Iran's persistence in evading its international responsibility to counter acts of terrorism emanating from its territory.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Permanent Representative

97-02561 (E) 290197 290197 300197

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Annex

Letter dated 25 January 1997 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General

I refer to the letter dated 14 January 1997 addressed to you by the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations (S/1997/38) and to our letter of 13 January 1997 addressed to you (S/1997/34, annex) informing you of the Iranian Government's refusal either to extradite or bring to trial the perpetrators of the heinous crime involving an attempt on the life of Mr. Udayy Saddam Hussein, Chairman of the Iraqi National Olympic Committee and son of President Saddam Hussein of Iraq.

It is to be noted from the aforesaid Permanent Representative's letter that, instead of responding to the logic of international law, in particular the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, the Iranian Government has resorted to its customary practice of using words and expressions that are unacceptable in diplomatic usage and that it has done so for the purpose of evading its international responsibility to counter acts of terrorism.

I reject the aforementioned letter of the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations as bearing no relation, proximate or remote, to the subject of Iraq's letters as circulated in documents S/1996/1076 and S/1997/3, and I once again request you to intervene with the Iranian Government with a view to prevailing upon it to honour its international commitments by bringing the perpetrators to trial or by surrendering them to the Iraqi authorities for that purpose.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammed Said AL-SAHAF
Minister for Foreign Affairs

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S/1997/87
28 January 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 27 JANUARY 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government and with reference to the letter dated 22 July 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/1996/584), I have the honour to convey the following responses of my Government to the allegations made by Iraq in that letter:

1. Paragraph 1 (annex): The said outposts are abandoned and no military forces are stationed there.

2. Paragraph 2: The geographic coordinates referred to are incomplete; thus the case is not recognizable.

3. Paragraphs 3-7, 10 and 11: The allegations are unfounded and rejected.

4. Paragraph 8: The Iranian helicopter was flying over Iranian territory for the purpose of disembarking a Toyota vehicle and no violation occurred.

5. Paragraph 9: On 17 June 1996, Iranian forces in charge of combating smuggling arrested four Iraqis who had crossed the border and were fishing in Iranian waters. On 20 June 1996, they were released and returned to Iraq after judicial process was completed.

It would be highly appreciated if the text of the present letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kamal KHARRAZI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

97-02567 (E) 290197 300197